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Abstract 
This contribution investigates whether and how the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) works as a security community-building 
instrument in EU–Morocco relations. The analysis is based on the 
argument that building an effective security community depends on a 
certain level of integration combined with a certain degree of domestic 
support. Inquiring into the extent to which the ENP is effective as a 
security community building instrument towards Morocco, we examine 
the actual level of Morocco’s integration with the EU and the domestic 
support for such integration. By focusing on the possibilities and the 
limits of the ENP as such an instrument, this analysis goes beyond 
previous studies of EU–Morocco relations that have focused exclusively 
on the effects of external governance. We conclude that the ENP has 
been relatively successful in promoting security community-building, 
although there is mixed evidence that Morocco is adapting to EU norms 
and regulation (external governance). This is because the process 
supports practices of mutual responsiveness rather than adaptations. 
Thus, the attractiveness of the ENP lies in its open-ended character and 
the fact that both parties seem to think that they are getting what they 
want. For the EU this is stability, migration control and gradual 
reforms, whereas for Morocco this includes greater access to European 
markets, financial support as well as a certain external legitimacy for 
the current regime. 
Published by Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 
Contents 
 
Introduction .......................................................................................... 4 
Morocco – a pioneer in the ENP south ................................................... 6 
Morocco and the level of integration into the EU ................................... 8 
The attractiveness of the EU to Morocco .............................................. 17 
Conclusions ......................................................................................... 21 
References ........................................................................................... 23 
 
 
 Introduction 
To what extent has Morocco become integrated into the EU – and does 
the EU remains attractive in Morocco in times of economic and political 
crisis in Europe? Our empirical focus is directed towards the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which has been developing since 2004. 
We begin with the assumption that the more Morocco is integrated into 
the EU and the more attractive the EU is in Morocco, the more likely is it 
that the country can be seen as gradually becoming an integrated part 
of the European security community. This is based on the argument 
presented in the introduction (Rieker) that economic and political 
integration and interdependence tend to lead to security and stability 
among the integrated countries. This is not a new argument: it has been 
stressed in the security community literature since the 1950s (Deutsch 
1957, Adler and Barnett 1998, Pouliot 2008). Here it should be noted 
that, from the perspective of security communities, ‘integration’ is not 
necessarily equivalent to formal accession to the EU, nor is the prospect 
of EU membership a necessary condition for such integration. By using 
integration as an analytical category, we can capture the emergence of 
dependable expectations of peaceful change through the creation of a 
‘sense of community’ as well as the emergence of common institutions 
and shared practices (Deutsch 1957 5, Adler and Barnett 1998 37).  
Expectations of peaceful change, mutual trust and practices of self-
restraint are often based on the existence of collective identities and 
shared values (Wendt 1999, Acharya 2001, Bially 2001). However, we 
argue that pluralistic security communities are not necessarily based 
on commonality of values (collective identity), but may hinge on 
compatibility of values or mutual responsiveness (Deutsch 1957, 
Möller 2007 46). Recent studies have also noted the role that networks 
of practitioners and communities of practice play in expanding security 
communities, since the development of common practices often 
precedes the creation of collective identities (Adler 2008, Pouliot 
2010). International and regional organizations such as the EU might 
function as security community building institutions, by providing 
venues where participants in transnational networks from various 
states can engage in practical cooperation (Bellamy 2008, Bremberg 
2010).  
The development of EU–Moroccan relations represents a highly 
interesting case in this regard. First, Morocco is geographically close to 
Europe and has a long, common history with much of the continent. 
Second, Morocco has a history of relatively greater independence from 
European colonialism than most other countries of North Africa. Third, 
it has chosen a different approach to domestic politics than its 
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neighbours, with a focus on pluralism and inclusion rather than 
exclusion of political adversaries. Fourth, Morocco was the first country 
to be granted ‘Advanced Status’, making it a pioneer within the ENP 
framework. Fifth, the Arab Spring has not led to political turmoil in 
Morocco, although political reforms have been undertaken and the 
country’s first Islamist-led government is in office since 2012. Taken 
together, this makes EU–Moroccan relations a case study that can 
provide valuable insights into the possibilities and limitations of the 
ENP as a security community-building instrument.   
In order to uncover the level of integration in EU–Morocco relations, 
we examine three dimensions: the current scope of the bilateral 
association agreements seen in relations to the EU acquis, the level of 
adaptation to the conditions set by the EU, and the level of 
participation in EU policies and programmes (Rieker). Assuming that 
security community-building is a result of integration as well as 
attraction, we also investigate the relative attractiveness of the EU. To 
what extent has the economic crisis has impacts on this dimension? We 
begin with the view that the level of attractiveness depends both on 
what Morocco benefits from the EU (e.g., financial contributions and 
access to the EU policies; also to a certain extent norms and values) 
and what it might receive from other regional actors. Understanding 
how these factors interact will give an idea of whether Morocco’s 
integration with the EU is likely to continue. A certain level of domestic 
support in the partner country – among elites and major constituencies 
– is crucial to the EU’s ability to achieve its objectives within the 
framework of the ENP.  
 
 Morocco – a pioneer in the ENP 
south 
Economic and political cooperation between the EU and Morocco has a 
long history, with diplomatic and commercial relations dating back to 
the early 1960s (Tovias 1996, Pierros, et al. 1999). Morocco even 
applied for membership in the EC in 1987. The application was rejected 
by Community foreign ministers on the grounds that Morocco could not 
be considered to be a European country; apart from that, Morocco was 
also far from meeting the EC/EU criteria at the time. With no prospects 
for membership, Morocco has subsequently been an active partner in 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and more recently the ENP. 
To further develop the bilateral relations, the EU and Morocco set up 
the EU–Morocco Association Agreement, which entered into force in 
2000 (Bicchi 2007). This agreement still forms the legal basis for 
relations between Morocco and the EU, also within the framework of 
the ENP.  
Although Morocco is still far from a fully-fledged liberal democracy, 
the regime has chosen a pathway of political inclusion rather than 
exclusion to ensure its political survival, from the very beginning 
(Willis 2012). The Moroccan constitution of 1956 established a multi-
party system. The regime has managed to co-opt radical movements by 
legalizing them as political parties, integrating them into the political 
process, as long as they do not challenge the authority of the monarchy 
itself.1 Following upon the reforms undertaken under Mohammed VI 
(and prior to the Arab Spring), Morocco became the first ENP country in 
the South to obtain Advanced Status in 2008. This agreement 
constitutes a ‘roadmap’ for widening the scope of EU–Moroccan 
relations by setting out new objectives in three main areas: closer 
political relations (with the holding of an EU–Morocco summit and the 
establishment of consultation mechanisms at the ministerial level); 
integration into the EU’s Internal Market on the basis of gradual 
adoption of the Community acquis in certain sectors and the alignment 
to the acquis in others; and sectoral cooperation. The agreement also 
stipulates that the human dimension (e.g. poverty alleviation, 
education and rural development) is to be prioritized.  
The fact that Morocco had experienced a certain degree of political 
liberalization before the Arab Spring might also explain why there have 
not been the same levels of popular unrest as in other North African 
                                                          
1  Interviews in Morocco, October 2013. 
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countries. The few demonstrations that took place also had a rather 
immediate impact, as they led the regime to launch a constitutional 
reform process that brought Morocco a step closer to resembling a 
constitutional monarchy already by September 2011. The new 
constitution strengthens and broadens the powers of the Prime Minister 
and the Parliament in the Moroccan political system, but it fails to 
circumscribe the king’s powers effectively. For instance, while the 
Prime Minister must be chosen from the majority party in the 
Parliament, the cabinet must still be approved by the monarch (Madani 
2012).  
The EU was quick to welcome Morocco’s new constitution as ‘a 
significant step [that]…signals a clear commitment to democracy and 
respect for human rights’ (European Commission 2011b). Elections 
were then held in November 2011; the EU and Council of Europe 
electoral monitoring teams were fairly positive concerning how the 
elections had been conducted (European Commission 2011a, Council 
of Europe 2012). Similar to many other countries in the region, an 
Islamist political party, le Parti de la Justice et du Développement 
(PJD), received the majority of the vote. This meant that the first 
(moderate) Islamist-led government took office in Morocco as from 
January 2012. According to representatives from the ministries and 
civil society, the reason why the constitutional amendments could be 
presented so quickly was that they had already been in the pipeline for 
some time and were thus not really initiated as a result of the 
demonstrations. That said, popular demands undoubtedly accelerated 
the reform process.2 
 
                                                          
2  Interviews in Morocco, October 2013. 
 Morocco and the level of 
integration into the EU 
Analysing the level of integration with the EU in terms of the scope of 
the agreements, the level of adaptation to EU standards and the level of 
participation in EU policies can give an indication of whether the EU 
can be said to be a security community-building institution as regards 
Morocco. 
Scope of agreements with the EU  
The scope of Morocco’s agreements with the EU must be described as 
comprehensive. Taken together, the Association Agreement, the ENP 
Action Plan and the roadmap for the Advanced Status cover most 
chapters of the acquis (with the notable exception of the chapter on 
Economic and Monetary Policy). However, there are important 
differences in the level of commitment that these agreements entail for 
Morocco. For example, the central element in the Association 
Agreement is the establishment of free trade between Morocco and the 
EU, gradually implemented since the agreement came into force in 
2000 (EU 2000). Since 2012, free trade on industrial goods is being 
enforced. Issues such as public procurement, intellectual property, 
competition, financial services, taxation, social policy, industrial 
policy, education, energy and environment are also addressed in the 
agreements. While the EU does not formally require Morocco to adopt 
the acquis, the logic behind regulatory convergence is clearly based on 
the view that third countries such as Morocco can gain greater access to 
the Internal Market if they not only align themselves to EU rules and 
standards, but eventually adopt the acquis in certain sectors. 
Negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
(DCFTA) are currently underway. The main objective of the DCFTA is to 
bring Moroccan legislation closer to EU legislation in trade-related 
areas; this is intended to extend significantly beyond the scope of the 
existing Association Agreement, to include trade in services, 
government procurement, competition, intellectual property rights and 
investment protection. In addition, it foresees the gradual integration 
of the Moroccan economy into the Internal Market, in areas like 
industrial standards and technical regulations, or sanitary and phyto-
sanitary measures.  
Further, an EU–Morocco Agreement on agricultural, processed 
agricultural and fisheries products entered into force on 1 October 
2012 (EU 2013), opening up for free trade in almost all products that 
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comply with European standards and regulations. While the intention 
is that this agreement will eventually include most of the agricultural 
products (as soon as the Moroccan products correspond with EU 
standards), the provisions on free trade do not apply to labour and 
capital: instead, other agreements stipulate ‘cooperation’ on these 
issues. Concerning migration, for instance, a Migration and Mobility 
Partnership was launched between the EU and Morocco in June 2013 
(Council of the EU 2013). As yet this remains merely a declaration of 
intent. However, the intention is a win–win cooperation where the EU 
will open up for increased immigration for certain groups, and Morocco 
will commit itself to assist the EU in fighting illegal migration. 
The current Association Agreement also covers cooperation in the 
areas of justice, freedom and security, as well as foreign, security and 
defence policy. It should be noted that with the adoption of the new 
ENP Action Plan3 and the road map for the Advanced Status, the 
agenda for cooperation on matters relating to JHA (e.g. migration, visa, 
border control, judicial and police cooperation) and CSDP (e.g. civil 
and military crisis management) has expanded significantly.  
Level of adaptation/alignment  
Overall assessments of Morocco’s level of adaptation or alignment to 
the EU and the ENP criteria4 have been generally positive (Van Hullen 
2012). According to the ENP country report for 2010, Morocco is 
considered to be an important economic partner for the EU in the 
region as well as a strategic ally in facing many common challenges, 
including the fight against terrorism and illegal migration (European 
Commission 2010). Beyond this, the Commission  also emphasized the 
need for improvement in areas such as the development of an 
independent juridical system (European Commission 2010 4). This 
assessment is echoed in the most recent country report. However, the 
areas of concerns are made more explicit. For example, it is argued that 
Morocco has taken steps to start implementing the key 
recommendations of the EU, but that it has not yet completed them, 
and the EU raises concerns about the current association law as well as 
the lack of judicial independence in Morocco (European Commission 
2013a, b). The EU also notes that the Moroccan government has 
adopted only one out of the nineteen laws necessary for the new 
constitution to enter into force. In the following, we will inquire into 
how Morocco scores in terms of the ENP criteria of democracy 
promotion and good governance, the rule of law and respect for human 
                                                          
3  The negotiations on a new ENP action plan were finalized in November 2012 for the 
period 2013–2017. 
4  Democracy promotion, respect for human rights, rule of law, good governance, 
market economy principles and sustainable development. 
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rights, as well as market economy principles and sustainable 
development. 
Democracy promotion and good governance. Concerning the first 
ENP criterion, democracy promotion, there remain numerous examples 
of non-democratic features in Morocco. First and foremost, the king still 
enjoys far-reaching powers. While his powers resemble more and more 
the powers of a president in a strong presidential system, the position 
of the monarch is determined by inheritance, not by the ballots. This 
means that a very basic undemocratic feature remains. On the other 
hand, the legitimacy and broad popular support enjoyed by the 
monarchy are beyond doubt. Many of our interviewees seemed 
surprisingly confident that the king intervenes only when necessary, 
and that they perceive the risk of misuse of power as low.5 
Even though it can be argued that the power of the monarchy, in its 
current form, represents an obstacle to further democratization of the 
Moroccan state, the king enjoys a high degree of legitimacy in 
Moroccan society, among the elites as well as in society at large. 
Several of our interviewees argue that the king is in many ways seen as 
a guarantee against any form of religious extremism and as source of 
stability, pluralism, tolerance and the respect for human rights, 
including women’s rights.6  
Morocco today is not a state in post-revolution transition. Rather, it 
is an authoritarian monarchy characterized by a gradual political 
liberalization. Importantly, this top–down process is managed by the 
monarchy itself (Volpi 2010). Some argue that the king has played a 
tactical game, making some constitutional amendments so as to shore 
up his legitimacy without having to give up his power (Benchemsi 
2012). Others hold that this ‘controlled democratization process’ can 
help to explain why the development in Morocco seems more stable 
than in many other countries in the region.7 However, it is too early to 
say whether the reforms will be sufficient. As long as the country 
suffers from unequal economic development, high illiteracy levels, 
deficiencies in the educational system, and corruption (apart from the 
other remaining non-democratic features), there is always the risk of 
political and social unrest (Dennison, et al. 2011 2).  
Due to the prevailing non-democratic features and the high levels of 
poverty, some hold that the EU policy has failed. They argue that the 
EU seem to give priority to short-term stability and security over the 
promotion of democracy (Kausch 2010, Graciet and Laurent 2012). 
However, many of our interviewees in Morocco disagree, presenting the 
                                                          
5  Interviews in Morocco, October 2013. 
6  Interviews in Morocco, October 2013. 
7  Interviews in Morocco, October 2013. 
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ongoing and gradual reform process as crucial for the Moroccan 
economy as well as for regional security and stability. In their view, the 
king’s role as an arbitrator among various interests in the country will 
remain important as long as democratic institutions do not function as 
intended.8  
A further dynamic to emerge after the Arab Spring is closer 
cooperation between the EU and the Council of Europe (CoE) in 
Morocco. The Moroccan reform process is now supported by a joint EU–
CoE programme. The EU contributes financial assistance (mainly in the 
form of budgetary support), while the CoE and certain European states 
(through ‘twinning projects’) engage in training activities and 
assistance in the actual reform process. In June 2011, the Moroccan 
Parliament was also accorded status as ‘partner for democracy’ by the 
CoE. Since then representatives from the Moroccan Parliament have 
participated in all Commissions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
CoE (PACE) in order to learn how to establish a well-functioning 
opposition as well as other fundamental aspects of a democracy. A 
further example is the newly launched process  by CoE to assess the 
legal and institutional anti-corruption framework in Morocco. 9   
This kind of cooperation is highly important since the most difficult 
challenges for Morocco seem to revolve around implementation of the 
new constitution, in particular the reform of the justice sector (e.g. 
training of judges). According to our interviewees, this process has 
slowed down with the PJD in government since 2012. It is uncertain, 
however, whether this is due to lack of political will or lack of 
experience in governing. In any case, pro-reform individuals in the 
administration as well as in civil society in Morocco are deeply 
concerned at this delay.10 The latest report from Freedom House 
characterizes Morocco as “partly free”, but with somewhat lower scores 
that those awarded to Lebanon and Tunisia (Freedom House 2014). 
Rule of law and respect for human rights. The National Council for 
Human Rights (CNDH) was established in 2011 on the initiative of the 
king. While it may seem tempting to dismiss this as mainly a cosmetic 
reform, it is worth noting that the President of the CNDH is a well-
known former communist, Driss El Yazami who recently returned to 
Morocco from many years in exile in France. The CNDH is to advise the 
government in matters of human rights. While the new constitution is 
quite far-reaching in its provisions on human rights, there are still 
numerous examples of violations of its articles. According to our 
interviewees, these incidents must primarily be understood as a result 
of the lack of a well-developed training programme for the police force, 
                                                          
8  Interviews in Morocco, October 2013. 
9  Interviews in Morocco, October 2013. 
10  Interviews in Morocco, October 2013. 
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lawyers and judges aimed at ensuing coherent implementation of the 
laws.11  
Some limits on the freedom of expression have persisted, such as 
criticizing Islam, the monarchy or the figure of the king. Also freedom 
of association is respected only in part. The new constitution protects 
for the first time the right to create associations, but a recent report 
from Human Rights Watch notes that Moroccan officials continue to 
arbitrarily impede the legalization of many associations, especially 
groups that defend the rights of Saharawis, Amazighs (Berbers), sub-
Saharan migrants, as well as associations whose leadership includes 
members of al-Adl wal-Ihsan (Justice and Spirituality)  (Human Rights 
Watch 2013).  In Western Sahara, the authorities withheld legal 
recognition for all local human rights organizations that support 
Saharawi independence. 
Together with the EU, the Council of Europe plays an increasingly 
important role in assisting Morocco in the implementation of its new 
constitution. For instance, the Ministry of Justice has obtained observer 
status in the CoE Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ). 
Market economy principles. The Moroccan economy has undergone 
a process of liberalization since the 1980s and it is increasingly more 
open to foreign investors and international trade. According to the 
World Bank, Morocco has experienced notable economic growth 
recently (on average about 5.1% between 2001 and 2008, which is 
almost twice as high as the average in the 1990s) (World Bank 2012). 
Growth is also more stable than in the 1990s and inflation has 
remained low (on average about 2.5% per annum). With increases in 
investments from some 25% to 36% of GDP between 2001 and 2008, 
the prospects of sustained economic growth have improved as well. It 
is worth noting that the Moroccan economy has shown resilience in the 
wake of the global financial crisis (following a slowdown in 2009, non-
agricultural GDP grew by 5%, and overall GDP grew by an estimated 
3.3% in 2010) (ibid).  
While Moroccan economy has been growing at a faster rate than 
many southern European countries in recent years, Morocco still faces 
economic and financial problems, like budget deficits and 
unemployment (9.1% in 2010).12 The main challenge for the Moroccan 
economy is its high dependency on a few sectors: agriculture, tourism 
and textile production. All three sectors are fragile – the first is 
                                                          
11  Interviews in Morocco, October 2013. 
12  Although this is significantly lower than the levels of unemployment in the 1990s, 
less than half of the population participate in the labour market. Among youth 
(aged 15–24), unemployment is almost three and a half times as high (World Bank, 
2012). 
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dependent on climate and rainfall, the second requires stability in the 
region, the third hinges on market access. 
The EU generally supports economic reforms in Morocco but notes 
that the announced reform of public finances which envisions a more 
transparent and democratic control over public spending has not yet 
been adopted. The EU also supports the Moroccan government’s 
actions to fight poverty in the country, like the National Initiative for 
Human Development (INDH), but it also notes that the national labour 
legislation is not respected by many companies and the Moroccan 
labour inspection is under-resourced (European Commission 2013a, b). 
Other examples of the problems that the goal of aligning Moroccan 
legislation to the acquis entail in practice include the issue of food 
security, where the new veterinary law prepared in 2011 is intended to 
provide Morocco with a regulatory framework which harmonizes with 
EU sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations, but it has not yet been 
adopted. Progress has also been slow on regulatory convergence on 
issues such as intellectual property, state aid and competition. In 
general, the problems involved in enforcing market economy principles 
are related to the weak regulatory powers of the Moroccan authorities, 
as well as high levels of corruption that obstruct competition. 
But there are examples to indicate that in some sectors the Moroccan 
economy is both liberalizing and converging with EU standards. In 
2008, the EU–Morocco ‘single sky’ agreement on air traffic regulations 
was signed (Council of the EU 2006). Two new ground handling 
operators have been established at Moroccan airports; concerning air 
traffic regulations Morocco participates as non-permanent observer in 
the Open Sky committee and cooperates with the European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA) to put in place aviation safety regulations that 
harmonize with EU standards.   
Sustainable development. In the field of environmental protection, 
there are signs of regulatory convergence. For instance, Morocco 
envisions aligning its legislation on the use of water with EU directives. 
Beyond this, Morocco is also investing in developing in renewable 
energy and green growth. Of particular interest is investment in a solar 
energy programme that Morocco has been developing independent of 
EU funding. This project is based mainly on national funding (the 
Hassan II Fund) as well as financial support from Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates, although international donors such as the World 
Bank and the European Investment Bank have also been involved. 
While this project has the potential to make Morocco self-sufficient in 
energy supply, there are also ambitions of being able to export energy 
to Europe. At present, realization of this solar energy project suffers 
from the economic crisis in Europe, political turbulence in the region as 
well as some technical uncertainties.  
Pernille Rieker and Niklas Bremberg 
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Level of participation in the EU 
Morocco’s Advanced Status offers the opportunity to deepen dialogue 
and cooperation, including participation in EU policies on key strategic 
issues of concern to both parties. Here we examine participation along 
two dimensions: the form and the frequency of meetings; and actual 
participation in various policy areas. The empirical focus is on the 
fields of security and trade, which seem to be where there is mutual 
interest in have greater participation of Morocco. 
Form and the frequency of meetings with the EU. Meetings between 
Morocco and the EU have been many and rather frequent, varying in 
level and format. Those on the highest political level take place within 
the Association Council (Jaidi 2010). The first meeting of the EU–
Morocco Association Council was held in October 2000 and the latest 
meeting was held in April 2012. Representatives of the EU and Morocco 
have met more or less annually in this constellation. According to the 
EU–Morocco Association Agreement, the parties are to consult each 
other on political and strategic issues of common concern. This 
principle is also referred to in the roadmap of the Advanced Status, 
which lists a range of proposals as to how the EU and Morocco could 
enhance their bilateral political and economic relations – such as 
holding ministerial meetings between Morocco and EU member-states, 
as well as allowing Moroccan diplomats and functionaries to 
participate at Council working group meetings and in the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC). Meetings between Moroccan officials and 
representatives of the PSC have been held on various occasions since 
2008.  
There is also close parliamentary cooperation between Morocco and 
the EU. As one way of implementing the Advanced Status, an EU–
Morocco Joint Parliamentary Committee was established in 2010. The 
purpose is to strengthen the ties between the European Parliament and 
its Moroccan counterpart, and the committee meets regularly in 
Brussels and Strasbourg. Besides these political meetings there are 
regular (and quite frequent) meetings between representatives of the 
European Commission and Moroccan officials relating to more 
technical aspects of EU–Morocco cooperation, such as projects within 
the ENP framework and financial assistance. This means that, in 
addition to the frequency of the different types of meetings, there is 
some flexibility in the meeting structures that allows for more contact 
points when needed. 
Level of participation in EU policies. Morocco’s agreements with the 
EU and its Advanced Status stipulate that the EU is to support Morocco 
in several fields (including human rights, science and technology, 
consumer health). This provides a basis for financial aid, but also for 
Moroccan access to some EU programmes and thereby greater 
participation in various EU policies.  
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In security policy, Morocco contributes to the EU’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), including defence (CSDP), as well as to EU 
internal security. While Morocco has agreed to give support to CFSP 
declarations on a case-by-case basis, the two parties have not yet 
agreed on implementation procedures (Lecha 2011 238). On the other 
hand, besides setting up an EU–Morocco summit and holding regular 
meetings to enhance political dialogue, the new political agenda 
includes Morocco’s participation in EU-led crisis management 
operations (military and civilian) and supporting statements of the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Idrissi 2011).  
As mentioned, Morocco also contributes to EU internal security. EU–
Morocco cooperation includes the development of border control 
mechanisms, enhancing of Morocco’s participation in training and 
seminars of the European Police College, the establishment of 
cooperation between Morocco and the European Police Office as well as 
greater cooperation with the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and 
Drug Addiction (Idrissi 2011). Morocco participates in regional 
cooperation on disaster management and civil protection in the 
Mediterranean, which the EU has promoted since the 1990s (Bremberg 
2010). Further, the EU’s Community Mechanism for Civil Protection 
was activated and used in the operation sent to Morocco after the 2004 
earthquake, and Moroccan authorities were also allowed access to the 
Common Emergency and Information System (CECIS) of the 
Community Mechanism in order to receive the information dispersed in 
connection with a crisis management exercise in 2008 (Council of the 
EU 2008). 
The reforms of the Moroccan judiciary (see above) have a link to the 
cooperation with the EU on internal security. In terms of judicial 
cooperation, the EU supports the proposed upgrading of the Moroccan 
legislative and institutional framework for asylum-seekers in 
accordance with international standards. To this can be added the 
possibility for Morocco to access CoE conventions related to judicial 
matters which are open to non-member participation, and the 
establishment of a cooperative agreement between Morocco and 
Eurojust (the European agency for the fight against crime), as well as 
the EU’s support for  cooperation on reforms in order to implement the 
recommendations of the Instance d’Equité et Reconciliation (IER) 
(Idrissi 2011) .  
One recent achievement in Morocco–EU relations is the signing of a 
mobility partnership in June 2013. The objective is to improve the 
information available to qualified Moroccan citizens on employment, 
education and training opportunities available in the EU, and to make 
mutual recognition of professional and university qualifications easier. 
A further objective is to support the integration of Moroccan citizens 
who regularly visit an EU member-state. As regards irregular migration, 
the intention is for the EU and Morocco to work together in combatting 
Pernille Rieker and Niklas Bremberg 
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the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, and to 
provide assistance for victims of these crimes. While this is not yet 
realized, Morocco is foreseen as an active partner that will contribute to 
EU policy on migration. 
Concerning trade, Morocco has gained greater access to the Internal 
Market and is becoming a more integrated participant in the European 
economy. Some 40–50 per cent of Moroccan imports and exports are 
estimated to originate from or be destined to the Internal Market (Dawson 
2009). While these figures have remained basically constant since the 1990s, 
the total volume of trade has expanded steadily. The total value of trade in 
goods between the EU and Morocco was estimated to €26 billion in 2012 
(see Figure 1). The global financial crisis had a negative impact on EU–
Moroccan trade in 2009–2010 but it bounced back in 2011–2012. However, 
here it should be noted that Morocco has had an annual trade deficit of about 
€6–7 billion to the EU since 2008.  
Figure 1. EU–Morocco Trade Volumes, 1988–2012 
 
 
Trade in goods, figures in € billions (Source: European Commission). 
The launch of negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement (DCFTA) early in 2013 and the entry into force of a Fisheries 
Agreement in October 2012 (European Commission 2013a) are 
indications that Morocco’s integration into the European economy will 
continue. 
 
 The attractiveness of the EU to 
Morocco 
The analysis above shows that Morocco has achieved a far-ranging 
level of integration and cooperation with the EU. The scope of 
agreements is broad, and the level of adaptation or at least alignment 
to the ENP criteria is relatively high, despite some important 
shortcomings. Finally, the EU and Morocco have many and flexible 
meeting formats, also conducive to a high degree of participation in EU 
policies. As noted, most political and civil society actors perceive the 
establishment of closer ties to the EU as beneficial for economic growth 
and democratization. This indicates that the EU has a certain 
attraction. There is also evidence that those in favour of further 
democratic reforms in Morocco see the process of moving closer to the 
EU as a powerful tool for triggering domestic reform (Dennison, et al. 
2011). A survey conducted by TNS opinion for EU Neighbourhood 
Barometer in autumn 2012 showed that 69% of those interviewed had 
positive perceptions of the EU (EU Neighbourhood Barometer 2012). 
This would indicate that support for closer ties with the EU is not 
restricted to certain segments of the Moroccan economic and political 
elite.  
However, continued support is likely to depend on the ability of 
both parties to deliver on the lofty promises entailed in the idea of ever-
closer cooperation. Support for closer ties with the EU will depend on 
continuing economic growth but also on the benefits that Morocco can 
expect – as well as the relative attractiveness of other actors in the 
region, such as the Gulf states.  
Benefits and access 
Achieving Advanced Status in its relations to the EU is important for 
Morocco for several reasons. First, it provides financial support through 
development aid – Morocco tops the list of partners that benefited from 
EU financial support as part of neighbourhood assistance, receiving 
some €205 million in 2009 (Dennison et al. 2011:4). EU’s support to 
Morocco through the ENP for 2011–2013 is estimated to €580.5 
million, an increase of approx. 20 per cent over 2007–2010 (see Table 
1). Additional funding to Morocco under the SPRING programme, as 
part of the EU’s response to the Arab Spring, amounts to €80 million, 
primarily for support to human rights and education, health and rural 
development.  
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Table 1. Financial Aid EU–Morocco 1995–2013 
 
 Total amount  
(million euro) 
Amount per year 
(million euro) 
Amount per  
inhabitant (euro) 
MEDA I (1995–1999) 660 132 4.7 
MEDA I (1995–1999) 660 132 4.7 
ENPI (2007–2010) 654 163.5 5.4 
ENPI (2011–2013) 580 193.3 6.2 
Source: Jaidi & Martín (2010) 
Most of EU funding is budgetary support, although there have been 
intentions of supporting Moroccan civil society to a greater extent. 
However, it is not the amount of money that Morocco receives from the 
EU that is crucial for development and growth of the Moroccan 
economy. According to the interviewees, it is greater access to the 
Internal Market that will make the largest impact.13 Therefore, the 
economic crisis in Europe, together with the instability in many 
neighbouring countries, poses the real challenge for the Moroccan 
economy. According to several of our interviewees, the real ‘game-
changer’ for the Moroccan economy would be greater regional 
economic integration in the Maghreb region – something that both the 
EU and Morocco officially support. However, this will be difficult to 
achieve as long as relations between Morocco and Algeria remain tense 
and the conflict level in the region is high.14  
Beyond trade, the mobility partnership is also important for 
Morocco, due not to remittances from Moroccans working abroad. 
According to a recent report on Moroccan migration it is estimated that 
about 4.5 million Moroccans were living abroad (legally or illegally) in 
2012 and that more than 80% were living in Europe (European 
Training Foundation 2013). Although Moroccan migration to the Gulf 
countries has increased, Europe (France, Spain and Belgium in 
particular) continues to be the most popular destination by far for 
Moroccan migrants (European Training Foundation 2013). Remittances 
(mainly from Moroccans living in Europe) are estimated to represent as 
much as 10% of the country’s GDP, although money-flows ‘fluctuate in 
accordance with the European economic cycle’ (Escribano 2008 146). 
This may also explain why the Moroccan government has been eager to 
cooperate with the European Commission in trying to prevent illegal 
migration, as this is a condition set by the EU for opening up for certain 
groups of qualified Moroccan workers. 
Our analysis has shown that cooperation with the EU offers Morocco 
various means and opportunities for dealing with problems relating to 
security and economic development. It should also be noted that 
                                                          
13  Interviews in Morocco, October 2013. 
14  Interviews in Morocco, October 2013. 
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Morocco needs the Union’s support in order to tackle a range of issues 
that could undermine the regime’s domestic legitimacy and thus 
stability – most importantly, the Western Sahara conflict.15 However, 
the EU has sought to avoid becoming directly engaged in the conflict 
due to the diverging positions of its member-states (Vaquer i Fanés 
2004).  
Still, there are signs that the EU might become more involved. For 
example, at the EU–Morocco summit in 2010, the President of the 
European Council, Herman van Rompuy, said that the EU wishes to see 
improvements regarding human rights in Western Sahara (European 
Council 2010). Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty provides for a greater 
involvement of the European Parliament in shaping the EU’s relations 
with third countries, and the Parliament has traditionally been a strong 
supporter of the right of the Saharawi population to decide on 
independence. According to our interviewees, however, greater 
integration with the EU might serve to provide greater legitimacy to 
Morocco’s position in the long run.16 That, of course, remains to be 
seen. 
Moroccan identity involves a mix of Arab, African and European 
identities, although the European affiliation was emphasized as the 
most important by our interviewees.17 It is clear that there is some 
pride connected with being the first partner country in the South to 
have a special relationship with the EU, and thus be referred to as a 
model for other countries in the region.18 Obviously, closer integration 
with the EU will tend to reinforce Morocco’s European affiliation.  
Competition from other actors 
Financial support from Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE is 
important for Morocco, and in the wake of the Arab Spring there have 
been signs of closer ties developing between Morocco and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC). The GCC has launched a USD 5 billion 
development aid programme in Morocco, and a new GCC–Morocco 
partnership envisions closer cooperation on trade, investment, energy, 
education and environment (Arab News 2013). Morocco and Saudi 
Arabia have enjoyed close relations for many decades, and Saudi 
                                                          
15  For an overview of the Western Sahara conflict, see Jensen 
(2005)20052005200520052005Jensen, E. (2005). Western Sahara: Anatomy of a 
Stalemate. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner. 
 20052005JENSEN, E. 2005. Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate, Boulder, CO, 
Lynne Rienner.JENSEN, E. 2005. Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate, Boulder, 
CO, Lynne Rienner.2005200520052005JENSEN, E. 2005. Western Sahara: Anatomy 
of a Stalemate, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner.2006.  
16  Interviews in Morocco, October 2013. 
17  Interviews in Morocco, October 2013. 
18  Interviews in Morocco, October 2013. 
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Arabia is a firm supporter of Moroccan claims to Western Sahara (Willis 
2012). However, the fact that Morocco declined an invitation to join the 
GCC in 2011 indicates the limits of this relationship. 
In terms of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), France is by far 
Morocco’s main provider (representing 33% in 2011); Spanish FDI has 
increased substantially over the last decade (6% in 2011). That said, 
the UAE and Saudi Arabia have recently increased their share of the 
FDI stock in the country (17% and 6% in 2011) (Invest in Morocco 
2011).  
The value of Morocco’s trade with other major powers is well below 
that of its trade with the EU. For example, in 2012 Moroccan trade in 
goods with the EU represented 50% of the total value, whereas trade 
with China represented 5%, trade with Saudi Arabia represented 4.4% 
and trade with the USA, 6%. The 2004 free trade agreement with the 
USA is likely to strengthen Morocco’s position as economic partner 
with both the USA and the EU, indicating that Morocco will continue to 
view the EU as its main economic and political partner in the 
foreseeable future.  
 
 Conclusions 
Through the ENP framework the EU has offered integration à la carte, 
allowing those partners in the neighbourhood that are ready to 
undertake the necessary reforms to go ahead. As we have seen, 
Morocco has welcomed the ENP philosophy. The scope of agreements 
between EU and Morocco is very broad and the level of participation is 
high, particularly in the fields of trade and internal security. In terms of 
adaptation to ENP criteria as well as to the EU acquis, our analysis 
indicates alignment rather than adaptation. On basic criteria like 
democracy and human rights, important shortcomings remain. 
However, we also note that the Moroccan administration is convinced 
that further reforms and thereby further integration with the EU are in 
the interest of the country.  
Even though this process of alignment and adaptation is costly, our 
interviewees describe it as crucial for Morocco’s long-term economic 
development as well as for security reasons. The political and 
administrative leadership is well aware that instability in the Maghreb 
and Sahel could have spill-over effects on Morocco. Further economic 
integration and political cooperation are seen as the best means to 
avoid such a scenario. Given the turbulent situation in neighbouring 
countries and Morocco’s tense relations with Algeria, the prospects for 
regional integration in the Maghreb are bleak. This makes integration 
with the EU even more important for Morocco.19  
Our analysis indicates that neither the ongoing economic crisis in 
Europe nor the Arab Spring have changed the course of EU–Morocco 
relations. While Morocco is adapting to a world of global power shifts 
in which the Western powers are facing relative decline, the EU is still 
perceived as its main economic partner, a source of stability as well as 
an inspiration. Likewise, as the EU is grappling to come to terms with 
how to respond to the profound crises and changes underway in the 
countries in the Southern neighbourhood. Morocco is among the very 
few partners in the region with whom the EU enjoys broad and deep 
cooperation. Indeed, the crises only seem to have brought the two even 
closer together. 
Thus we conclude that Morocco is closely coupled to the European 
security community. Our analysis also shows the ENP works as an 
instrument for building a security community. On the other hand, it 
should be noted that the reform process in Morocco seems to be mostly 
                                                          
19  Interviews in Morocco, October 2013. 
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governed by the interests of the Moroccan regime rather than 
developing as a consequence of any real pressure from the EU. 
Moreover, the cooperative dynamic between the EU and Morocco 
appear to be more an effect of the high degree of mutual 
responsiveness that have emerged over the years and which existed 
also before the ENP was launched. This mutual responsiveness is 
ultimately based on the belief that this is a relationship equally 
beneficial for both parties. For the EU this would be stability, migration 
control and gradual reforms; for Morocco, it would be greater access to 
European markets, financial support and external legitimacy for the 
regime.  
The attractiveness of the ENP lies in its open-ended character which 
makes it particularly equipped to accommodate the different interests 
of the parties. Even though the ENP as regards Morocco ‘works’ mainly 
thanks to pre-existing dispositions on both sides, it can nonetheless be 
seen as a security community building instrument, by further 
institutionalizing EU–Moroccan relations through the creation of 
important new venues for cooperation and  interaction. The fact that 
Morocco participates in an increasing number of EU policy fields also 
serves to tie Moroccan practitioners closer to policy networks centred 
on the institutions in Brussels.  
Even though it may be argued that the reform process in Morocco is 
driven mainly by the regime’s interest in survival and securing external 
legitimacy, the EU definitely serves as inspiration for many reform-
minded actors in Morocco. The EU can be criticized for granting 
external legitimacy to a political system which still does not fully 
respect human rights or effectively circumscribe the powers of the 
monarch – but the reform process in Morocco is moving forward 
nonetheless. Even if the Moroccan regime might be simply ‘playing 
along’, without any deeply-felt commitment to democratic norms, it 
continues to play to the tune set by the EU and other European partners  
– and that may lead to more substantial changes over time.  
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